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Act LVIII of 2001 on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank, which entered into effect on 13 July 2001, defines the primary objective of
Hungary’s central bank as the achievement and maintenance of price stability. Low inflation allows the economy to function
more effectively, contributes to better economic growth over time and helps to moderate cyclical fluctuations in output and
employment.
In the inflation targeting system, from August 2005 the Bank seeks to attain price stability by ensuring an inflation rate near
the 3 per cent medium term objective. The Monetary Council, the supreme decision-making body of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank,
performs a comprehensive review of the expected development of inflation every three months, in order to establish the
monetary conditions consistent with achieving the inflation target. The Council’s decision is the result of careful consideration
of a wide range of factors, including an assessment of prospective economic developments, the inflation outlook, money and
capital market trends and risks to stability.
In order to provide the public with clear insight into the operation of monetary policy and to enhance transparency, the Bank
publishes the information available at the time of making its monetary policy decisions. The Report presents the inflation
forecasts prepared by the Economic Analysis and Research and Financial, as well as the macroeconomic developments
underlying these forecast. The Report is published biannually, with partial updates to the forecasts also prepared twice a year.
The forecasts of the Economic Analysis and Research and Financial Analysis are based on certain assumptions. Hence, in
producing its forecasts, the Directorate assumes an unchanged monetary and fiscal policy. In respect of economic variables
exogenous to monetary policy, the forecasting rules used in previous issues of the Report are applied.
The analyses in this Report were prepared by staff in the MNB’s Economic Analysis and Research and Financial Analysis
Department under the general direction of Ágnes Csermely, Director. The project was managed by Mihály András Kovács,
Deputy Head of Economic Analysis, with the help of Zoltán Gyenes, and Barnabás Virág. The Report was approved for
publication by Ferenc Karvalits, Deputy Governor.
Primary contributors to this Report also include: Péter Bauer, Szilárd Benk, Gyõzõ Eppich, Péter Gál, Zoltán Gyenes, Áron
Horváth, Éva Kaponya, András Komáromi, Mihály András Kovács, Zsolt Lovas, Zsuzsa Munkácsi, Benedek Nobilis, György
Pulai, Róbert Szemere, Tímea Várnai, Barnabás Virág. Other contributors to the analyses and forecasts in this Report include
various staff members of the Economics Analysis and Research and the Financial Analysis and the Financial Stability
Department.
The Report incorporates valuable input from the Monetary Council’s comments and suggestions following its meetings on 11
February and 25 February 2008. The projections and policy considerations, however, reflect the views of staff in the
Economics Analysis and Research and the Financial Analysis Department and do not necessarily reflect those of the Monetary
Council or the MNB.
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The February central projection, which is based on the assumption that the
January monetary conditions, i.e. an exchange rate of EUR/HUF 256 and a base
rate of 7.5%, remain constant, is for inflation to be around 6% in 2008 and
slightly above 3.5% in 2009. Economic growth is expected to be 2% this year,
before gradually edging up to approximately 3% in 2009.
Overall, the risks around the central projection to inflation are broadly
balanced, while those to growth are on the downside. A potentially stronger-
than-expected slowdown in the global business cycle, causing international
commodity prices to fall, poses a downside risk to both inflation and growth. In
addition, inflation may be lower than the central projection if the disinflationary
effects of the slowdown in domestic economic activity are greater than
expected. However, if expectations become stuck above the inflation target, this
could pose an upside risk to inflation.
Earlier Reports stressed the importance of wage adjustment in the context of
meeting the inflation targets. According to more recent data, firms are
increasingly adjusting through their wage and price decisions, in order to avert
further deterioration in profit margins. The increase in skilled workers’
minimum wage in early 2008 will hinder this moderation in the rate of wage
growth, but the need to adjust will be underlined by weaker-than-expected
business conditions. Consequently, despite of a fall in the number of employees,
real wages are expected to grow slightly in 2008.
Expectations of businesses and households suggest that economic agents
anticipate an increasingly sluggish recovery in domestic economic activity. The
deteriorating outlook for growth in developed economies is casting a shadow
over the prospects of the Hungarian export sector; and, on the other hand,
improvement in domestic activity remains uncertain, due to the absence of a
turnaround in retail sales and investment. 
The subdued pace of real wage growth, coupled with a fall in employment, is
likely to drag on household consumption growth. The outlook for investment
has deteriorated recently, due to weakening external and domestic business
conditions, as well as rises in credit spreads. In addition, the slower-than-
expected growth of Hungary’s external markets is a negative factor with regard
to the outlook for the country’s export sector. Overall, the economy is likely to
pick-up at a very slow pace.
The fiscal adjustment measures have led to a significant improvement in
Hungary’s external position, in addition to contributing to the slowdown in
economic growth. The external financing requirement may be lower than
previously expected, as growth in domestic absorption is likely to be more
muted than earlier over the entire forecast period. But, looking forward, the
further improvement in external imbalance, in combination with subdued
investment spending and economic growth, may pose a risk to longer-term
sustainability.
In the February update, the central
projection is for inflation to be above
target throughout the entire forecast
period
There appears to be increasingly more
marked adjustment in the labour market
in order to restore corporate profitability
Growth prospects are worse looking
forward…
QUARTERLY REPORT ON INFLATION • UPDATE • FEBRUARY 2008 7
Overview
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
QUARTERLY REPORT ON INFLATION • UPDATE • FEBRUARY 20088
Despite a general loosening in labour market conditions and lower aggregate
demand, inflation prospects have also deteriorated since November. One
explanation for this is that, after a series of adverse cost shocks since the summer
of 2006 (increases in tax and contribution rates as well as hikes in administered
prices, linked to the fiscal adjustment measures, and then, from the summer of
2007, the sharp rise in unprocessed food prices), firms are currently facing more
upward pressure on costs. The sharp rises in energy costs have both
international and domestic origins. Imported inflation has risen due to the
historically high price of crude oil, while the stronger-than-expected upward
pressure from electricity prices due to changes in regulations is a shock of
domestic origin. Prices are likely to rise more strongly than previously thought,
due to (i) the high rate of increase in energy costs; and (ii) the accumulation of
adverse cost shocks over the past two years.
...and rising energy prices are likely force
firms to raise prices more than expected
over the entire forecast period
Inflation fan chart
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(The forecasts are conditional: the main scenario represents the most probable scenario which applies only if all the
assumptions presented in chapter 3 materialise; unless otherwise specified, percentage changes on previous year.)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Actual Projection
Inflation (annual average)
Core inflation1 2.2 2.4 6.0 5.2 3.6
Consumer price index 3.6 3.9 8.0 5.9 3.6
External demand (GDP-based) 2.1 3.9 3.5 2.5 2.5
Fiscal impact on demand2 -0.9 2.6 ↓ ↔ ↓
Household consumption 3.6 2.1 -2.3 0.0 1.3
Gross fixed capital formation 5.3 -2.8 -0.5 3.5 5.1
Domestic absorption 1.3 1.1 -0.6 0.8 2.7
Exports 11.5 18.9 14.5 10.5 9.6
Imports3 6.8 14.5 12.1 9.4 9.5
GDP 4.1 (4.3)* 3.9 (4.0)* 1.3 2.0 3.0
Current account deficit
As a percentage of GDP 6.8 6.5 ↓ ↓ ↓
EUR billions 6.0 5.8 ↓ ↓ ↓
External financing requirement
As a percentage of GDP 6.0 5.7 ↓ ↓ ↓
Labour market
Whole-economy gross average earnings4,8 8.8 8.2 8.0 (7.3) 6.8 (6.4) 5.2
Whole-economy employment5 0.0 0.7 0.2 -0.6 -0.4
Private sector gross average earnings6 6.9 9.4 9.1 (8.0) 7.8 (7.1) 6.8
Private sector employment5,8 0.3 0.9 1.0 -0.6 -0.6
Unit labour costs in the private sector5,7 2.8 4.4 8.0 3.4 2.7
Household real income 3.3 -1.5** -3.2 1.3 1.7
1
For technical reasons, this indicator may temporarily differ from the index published by the CSO; over the longer term, however, it follows a similar
trend. 
2
Calculated from the augmented (SNA) balance; a negative value means a narrowing of aggregate demand. 
3
As a result of uncertainty in the
measurement of foreign trade statistics, from 2004 the actual import figure and current account deficit/external financing requirement may be higher
than suggested by official figures or our projections based on such figures. 
4
Calculated on a cash basis. 
5
According to the CSO LFS data. 
6
Data including
the effect of whitening, consistent with headline CSO data. 
7
Private sector unit labour cost calculated with wage indicator excluding the effect of
whitening and the changed seasonality of bonuses. 
8
For 2008 wages, the numbers in brackets refer to wages excluding the effect of whitening and the
changed seasonality of bonuses, which are directly comparable with those in the November Report.
* Data adjusted for working-day variations are shown in brackets.,** MNB estimate.
↑ We are of the opinion that this particular forecast is expected to be higher than what is contained in the November 2007 Report.
↓ We are of the opinion that this particular forecast is expected to be lower than what is contained in the November 2007 Report.
↔ We are of the opinion that this particular forecast is expected to be about the same as what is contained in the November 2007 Report.
Summary table of the central projection
1.1. QUESTIONTABLE SIGNS OF A
TURNAROUND IN ECONOMIC GROWTH
GDP data for Q3 2007 have reinforced our earlier
expectations that the deceleration in economic growth may
have bottomed out in the second quarter. However, while we
previously expected a marked domestic recovery in the
second half of last year as the primary effects of the fiscal
measures wore off, the data on economic activity and
expectation surveys since November indicate that the
negative effects of adjustment may persist longer than
expected. The estimate for Q4 GDP growth also support this
view. Preliminary data indicate 0.7% year-on-year growth in
the final quarter (data adjusted for working day and calendar
effects), after 1% in previous period, and the quarterly
growth rates stagnated below 1%.
Economic growth has been driven primarily by the export-
oriented manufacturing sector. As import growth has
remained moderate due to falling domestic demand, external
trade made a historically strong contribution to growth
through net exports. In respect of domestic factors,
household consumption dropped further in the second half
of the year, as a result of continuously worsening household
income prospects (recent pick-up in inflation, declining
employment). In addition, changes in construction
production indicate that no significant turning point can be
expected in investment despite the considerable amount of
EU funds received. At the same time, slack government
demand and a decline in agricultural production generated a
negative growth contribution.
1.2. UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE
SLOWDOWN IN EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
ACTIVITY
The past quarter saw an increasing deterioration in the
prospects for global activity. The financial turbulence
originating from the sub-prime mortgage market in the USA
may cause a considerable setback for the US economy which,
in turn, may have a negative effect on the European
economic outlook. Nevertheless, the latest statistical data on
European economic growth do not indicate a significant
deceleration. While euro area and German industrial activity
slowed in Q4 2007, the growth rate remained at historically
high levels.
At the same time, the growth of industrial production in
Hungary has been slowing since the middle of last year. The
reason for this drop in growth is a gradual slowdown in
export sales, which could not be counterbalanced even by the
rise in domestic sales which started from the second half of
the year. This increase in domestic sales was not caused by a
recovery but by a one-off factor: higher sales in the energy
industry (electricity, gas, steam and water supply). 
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1. Latest developments at the macroeconomic
level
Chart 1-1
Change in business confidence indicators 
(Three-month rolling averages)
Source: EUROSTAT.
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Chart 1-2
Economic growth in Hungary*
(Quarterly data, quarterly growth based on seasonally adjusted data)
* Latest data is a preliminary estimation of CSO.
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Decelerating production ahead of the euro area industrial
slowdown seems to be a general tendency in the region. This
apparent contradiction can be explained by the fact that, as
we indicated in our previous Reports, the region’s industrial
exports consist mainly of intermediary goods and therefore
are linked to an early phase of the European vertical chain of
production. Hence, it may be possible that deceleration in the
region precedes a decline of industrial production in Western
Europe to a certain extent. However, in the case of Hungary,
subdued investment growth may be limiting foreign sales
from the capacity side as well.
After an upturn in the middle of the year, growth in exports
of goods and services slowed down. Due to weak domestic
demand, however, a more significant drop was recorded in
imports. As a result, net exports continued to be the only
positive factor behind economic growth. As Hungarian
exports are increasingly linked to Central and Eastern
European countries where economic growth is faster-paced,
and because there is no indication yet of a significant
deceleration of economic activity in Europe, we do not
expect a major downturn in export dynamics over the short
run.
1.3. A FURTHER FALL IN 
WHOLE-ECONOMY INVESTMENT
Although 2007 saw a slight turnaround following a
substantial decline in the previous year, the latest investment
data appear to be less favourable than expected.
1
Furthermore, orders and construction industry production
data indicate that no quick upturn can be expected in
investment. The reason for the considerable decline in
construction industry production is a drop in government
investment and infrastructure construction, mainly due to the
fiscal austerity package, and, to a lesser extent, to
unfavourable tendencies in the real estate market.
The distribution of investment by sectors continues to be
extremely heterogeneous: investment grew in export-
oriented manufacturing, while investment activity declined in
other sectors. Moreover, contrary to the pick-up in the
business cycle, the increase in manufacturing, primarly
machinery investment is mainly attributable to a large
investment in one sector, the rubber industry, which means
that the investment growth is not widespread throughout the
sector. Apart from this sub-sector, our estimates suggest that
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS AT THE MACROECONOMIC LEVEL
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Chart 1-3
German industrial production and new export
orders
(Annual change calculated from trend)
Source: EUROSTAT.
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Chart 1-4
Industrial production in the region and the euro
area 
(Annual change calculated from trend)
Source: EUROSTAT.
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1 Instead of gross fixed capital formation data according to GDP statistics, our analyses rely on detailed sectoral investment data. In our view only the latter can provides
information about the extremely heterogeneous sectoral investment tendencies.
manufacturing investment growth will be weaker than in
earlier periods of upturn in Europe. Thus, growth in
manufacturing – especially in the export-oriented sectors –
can only be accomplished if capacity utilisation reaches a
historic peak.
Companies providing products and services mostly for the
domestic market clearly exhibited weak investment activity,
the primary reason for which was a decline in domestic
demand due to the fiscal adjustment and expectations which
continue to be unfavourable.
Housing investment, which represents one-quarter of all
economic investment, continued on the downward path
which started at the beginning of 2005 without any
significant adjustment. The upturn experienced in the first
half of 2007 is expected to be temporary. Developments in
real household income, household expectations, which have
not any shown significant improvement, and a slowdown in
credit-growth also seem to support this expectation.
The downturn in investment – as a result of budgetary
consolidation – was strongest in the government sector.
Funds from EU funds have not yet produced an upturn, but
this year’s statistics may indicate how they are used and
accounted for. 
1.4. DECLINING CONSUMPTION
DEMAND
In line with the assumptions of the latest Report, household
consumption expenditures declined less strongly than real
income in the second half of 2007. This means that
households attempted to counterbalance the effects of the
drop in real income partly by taking out loans and by relying
on previous savings.
Surprisingly, however, the data indicate that no significant
change occurred in the consumer confidence indicator or the
annual dynamics of retail sales. Therefore there may be no
considerable turning point in household demand, or it may
occur later than expected. On the income side, a change in
real wages that appears to be more unfavourable than
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
QUARTERLY REPORT ON INFLATION • UPDATE • FEBRUARY 200812
Chart 1-5
Investment and capacity utilisation in
manufacturing 
(Annual change) 
* Investment data adjusted for a one-off effect in the rubber industry.
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Chart 1-6
Investment in various sectors of the national
economy*
(Four-quarter rolling average) 
* Annual average volume indices are weighted averages of four consecutive
year-on-year volume indices, where weights are base period current price
values.
** Excluding energy, transport and other social, community and personal
services.
*** Including energy, transport and other social, community and personal
services.
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Chart 1-7
Development of retail sales and the GKI consumer
confidence indicator
(Annual change)
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previously thought (re-accelerating inflation, a decrease in
employment) as well as the unfavourable long-term income
outlook render our expectations concerning the strength of
the turning point rather uncertain. 
1.5. LABOUR MARKET: WAGE
ADJUSTMENT AND INITIAL SIGNS 
OF EMPLOYMENT ADJUSTMENT
The November Report assumed that over the short-term
companies – especially in the service sector – will attempt to
restore profitability by limiting their bonus payments. As for
long-term adjustment, we assumed that profit would be
regained mostly by reducing wage payments and, to a lesser
extent, by reducing employment. Moreover, we assumed that
while companies would be able to arrest the decline in
profits, they would not be able to gain a profit on labour
comparable to levels before the implementation of the fiscal
austerity package. 
The data received since the last Report corroborated our
hypothesis of adjustment through bonuses, because bonus
payments have fallen over the past four months. A favourable
development from the point of view of inflation is that wage
adjustment via the reduction of bonus payments was
especially strong in the market service sector. So far, there
seems to be no slowdown in regular wage growth, neither in
the month-on-month index nor in the year-on-year index.
However – in keeping with our earlier assumptions – this
may only be possible when wages are set for this year. Overall
wage adjustment in gross average earnings was stronger than
our previous expectation.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS AT THE MACROECONOMIC LEVEL
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* Bonuses were redistributed according to their historical seasonality if
there were shifts in pay-offs between month.
Chart 1-8
Wage development in private sector*
(Annual change)
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there were shifts in pay-offs between month.
Chart 1-9
Change in bonus payments*
(Annual change)
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The National Interest Reconciliation Council (OÉT) agreed on raising
gross wages by 5.0-7.5 percentage points on average in 2008. This box
looks at the extent to which this agreement may be consistent with the
MNB’s wage forecast for 2008. In addition, we will briefly address the
representative force of the agreements and will look at the extent to
which agreements in the past provided information about actual wage
increases.
In Hungary, the process of wage negotiations is decentralised in
nature. Wage agreements concluded by OÉT are not mandatory and
serve primarily as a guideline. The representative force of
participating employee interest representation bodies is low by
European standards.2 Therefore, it is not surprising that based on the
micro data agreements do not seem to have a strong supportive
effect for wages.3
Box 1-1: Effect of OÉT (National Interest Reconciliation Council) agreements on wages
2 The same may apply to employer interest representation bodies as well, although there are no official statistics about their representational force.
3 The distribution of wage raises does not indicate that a significantly large number of employees would receive wage increases that correspond to the minimum,
maximum or median amount of wage increase specified in the OÉT agreement.
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that actual wage increases in the
past correlated with the agreements, although this may be so purely
because the negotiating interest representation bodies were
adequately informed.4
In addition to the correlation, it is apparent that gross wage increases in
the past were always higher than the median value of the band
proposed by the OÉT. After 2000 the difference stood at around 1.0-
2.5%, but in some years the difference was clearly higher. This
consistently positive difference can be explained in several ways: partly
by statistics and partly by how wages are determined.
Statistical distorting factors
– A distortion of this kind may be caused in part by changes in the
composition of workplaces. The diminishing weight of low-wage
sectors and an increase in the number of white collar workers have
raised the wage index by an average of 0.5 per cent each year since
2002. In addition, the composition of workers within sectors may also
have changed.
– Deferred effect: Because wage increases occur all year round and not
only in January, the annual average wage in each year is affected by
wages in the previous year as well. In addition to the fact that wage
dynamics typically fell up until the middle of the decade, this deferred
effect reduced average wages in the base year to a greater extent than
in the year concerned, and thus distorted annual indexes upward
compared to actual increases.
The effect of how wages are determined
– Increases in the minimum wage: Distortion was stronger in years when
the minimum wage was raised significantly. Consequently, we assume
that the wage increase proposed in the agreement between the
parties was understood as a proposal pertaining to wages that were
not affected by such measures. By filtering out the estimated value of
these shocks (see the chart above), these years also show the usual
deviation.
– Mid-year wage adjustments: Several companies perform additional
wage increases in the course of the year, and we assume that they
consider the OÉT agreement as a recommendation for the wage
increase rate that is to take place at the beginning of the year. As wage
raises became less and less frequent, this effect naturally lost its force.
– Unexpected shocks: The deviation can also be explained by
unexpected shocks that occur in the course of the year (productivity,
inflation, etc.). The available data indicate that this effect is also more
apparent in the bonuses, which are easier to change in the course of
the year, than in the more inflexible regular wage component.5
Growth in regular wages correlates to the OÉT proposal to a greater
Chart 1-10
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OÉT wage agreements and gross wages
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4 The members of the OÉT, and corporate leaders, responsible for private wage policy, may have similar view on macroeconomic processes.
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Employment in the private sector decreased amongst
companies employing more than 5 persons, while the LFS
survey, which includes small enterprises as well, indicates
stagnation. Sectoral data indicate that the differences in
tendencies can be explained by changes in the number of
employees in one sector, namely the construction industry. In
manufacturing – in line with slower production – the number
of employees fell somewhat in the second half of the year. The
market service sector, which experienced a higher rate of profit
loss, also showed the first signs of employment adjustment in
Q3 2007. The increasing employment trend of the past years
has been clearly broken in this segment and employment
numbers have started to stagnate. On the other hand, the
number of working hours reached a historic low point,
possibly also indicating that a drop in the number of employees
will occur at an earlier date than suggested in our forecast.
Government employment has been declining continuously in
the last few months, and as a result labour usage stood at a
historically low level. Overall, flow data at the level of the
national economy also corroborate our previous expectations
regarding the loosening of the labour market. A decrease in
active workers at the beginning of the year gave way to
stagnation. Consequently, a drop in the number of employees
in the second half of the year resulted in an increase in
unemployment. Due two the formerly mentioned factors, the
‘tightness measure’ decreased further.
1.6. ACCELERATION INSTEAD 
OF DECELERATION IN YEAR-END
INFLATION DATA
In Q4 2007, inflation and core inflation moderated
somewhat according to previous quarter data. Inflation and
core inflation declined from 7.7% to 7.1%, and from 5.1%
to 4.7%, respectively. Even so, both indicators remained at a
higher level than indicated in our short-term projection.
7
In
addition, according to monthly data both indicators show a
re-acceleration of inflationary processes after October. The
clear reason for this is an increase in the price of processed
foods. The global food-price shock caused inflationary
pressure not only in Hungary, but in the region and in the
euro area during the last four months of 2007.
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extent than the total wage index. The difference due to a change in
bonuses correlates with labour-related profit dynamics.
In the case of the wage agreement for 2008, two factors may result in
significant deviation from past experience. On the one hand, the raise in
the guaranteed minimum wage in January 2008 might increase the gap:
we estimate its additional wage-increasing effect in the range of
approximately 0.5-1.9%, with a high degree of uncertainty.6 On the
other hand, the gap may be further reduced, as companies may be less
likely to deviate upwards from the agreement amidst unfavourable
economic conditions. Nevertheless, based on the aforementioned
reasoning, we assume that actual wage increases will approximate the
upper limit of the OÉT agreement rather than fall in the middle band
which, overall, confirms our wage forecast for 2008.
6 We assume that the average wages of employees who are affected by an increase of the guaranteed minimum wage would have increased at a rate corresponding
to the median value of the OÉT agreement, had it not been for this measure. High uncertainty is caused by the difference between macro and micro level estimates.
7 In line with our expectations the January data show moderate deceleration in inflation, but the price changes of processed food exceeded our short-term projection.
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The end of the year saw positive changes in the price of
foods, and this development was the major cause of
inflation in the past six months. The price level of
unprocessed foods no longer increased starting from
November. This may be an indication that the first large
wave of the agricultural price shock had an impact on
inflation. However, with regard to processed foods, which
represent a greater weight in the index, prices increased at
a higher rate than expected each month, and so far no
significant change can be expected in the time series.
Nonetheless, according to our expectations change will
begin to appear as well as in this group in early 2008, and
it is possible that excess global demand for agricultural
items may result in a change in the historical correlation
between processed and unprocessed food prices.
The inflation of goods and market services was in line with
our expectations. In 2007, the annualised quarterly price
increase of market services, adjusted for VAT and visit fee
effects, stood at 6 per cent while in the case of manufactured
products this indicator showed a moderate decline
8
. 
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Source: EUROSTAT.
Chart 1-14
Consumer price index in region
(Annual change)
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Chart 1-15
Inflation trend and the price of processed foods*
(Seasonally adjusted, annualised monthly change)
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8 The January month on month inflation rate of market services was surprisingly low. We’ll need additional data to decide whether it is a temporary or permanent
tendency. 
* Excluding effects of VAT changes and the introduction of visit fee.
** Excluding effects of VAT changes.
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Inflation of market services* and manufactured
products**
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The 12-month forward-looking inflation expectations of
households remained stable in Q1 2008, after a significant
increase in Q4 2007. Perceived inflation in the last 12
months rose further. Both indicators are at historically
high levels. However, there is a positive development in
that inflation expectations no longer exceed perceived
inflation.
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Perceived and expected inflation of households
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Market sentiment in recent months, and consequently the
price of domestic assets, was determined by the market
expectations related to the losses in the US sub-prime
mortgage lending market, the slowdown in the US economy
and the reaction of the central banks. Since the November
Report, overall business confidence and investors’ risk
tolerance have decreased further. The continued increase in
risk premiums led to considerable devaluation, especially for
higher risk assets with lower credit ratings.
News on losses sustained by large investment banks in the US
sub-prime mortgage lending business and the related
derivative financial products was frequent on the markets in
the past few months. The lack of confidence between banks
significantly increased the price of interbank lending and, as
a result, uncertainty still pervades the interbank dollar and
euro market. Central banks attempted to bring down the high
money market interest rates by liquidity enhancing
transactions, first independently, then, starting from
December, in a concerted effort. Although the steps taken by
the central banks mitigated the tension in the money markets,
they were unable to restore the lower interbank premiums
that were typical prior to August. In the meantime, growing
demand for safe government securities and increasing
expectations of interest rate cuts kept the yields of short-term
government securities at low levels.
The first wave of capital withdrawal from risky assets (e.g.
shares and higher risk corporate bonds) in August, related to
the crisis in the sub-prime mortgage lending market, was
followed by two more waves in November and January. Data
from the US real estate market indicated a continued
weakening of the sector. Although activity surveys in the
autumn suggested that the slump would be limited to
industries connected to the real estate sector, the extremely
weak labour market and business confidence indicators at the
end of December exacerbated recession fears. As a decline in
consumption in the USA has an impact on the economic
output of other countries as well through exports, this
contributed to the strong drop in global equity market prices.
Recently disclosed bank write-offs for losses indicate that
financial institutions underestimated their exposure, and may
continue to sustain significant losses in the future. The price
losses on financial sector equities also contributed to the fall
of stock exchange indices. 
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2. Financial markets
* Indicators of euro-denominated debt premiums broken down by credit
rating. 
Source: J. P. Morgan. 
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Fed policy rate, 3-month dollar interbank deposit
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Although the Fed declared in the autumn that the upside risks
to growth and the downside risks to inflation were
symmetrical, it also emphasized the increasing uncertainty,
and after November the emphasis shifted to the risks to
growth. While core inflation, both in November and
December, was higher than the Fed’s comfort zone, the US
central bank expects core inflation to be moderated by
slowing growth, and therefore in the Fed’s view it is more
necessary to mitigate the impact of tighter lending conditions
on the real economy.
Between November and February, the Fed cut its target rate
by 150 basis points, half of which took place at two regular
meetings, whereas the remaining 75 basis point cut was
decided at an unscheduled meeting, following panicky stock
market selling in January. On the back of mounting recession
fears, another 100 basis points of monetary easing has been
priced in until mid-summer. The negative economic outlook
is also apparent from the fact that the US government is
proposing measures – mostly tax-rebates – which they hope
will mitigate the decrease in household consumption. In
respect of prospective global market sentiment and investors’
willingness to assume risk, a key issue is to what extent the
falling real estate prices in the US and tighter lending
conditions will affect the real economy, via corporate
investment and household consumption.
Since the November Report, European stock markets also
recorded considerable price decreases despite the fact that the
economic prospects in the region are more favourable than in
the USA. Due to market turbulence, the possible effects of the
US slowdown and tighter lending conditions, confidence
indicators in Europe also fell, albeit not to the extent seen in
the US. At the same time, however, due to an increase in
energy and food prices, inflation in the euro area reached a
multi-year high. Early on, the European Central Bank
highlighted the risks of inflation in its communications,
although it also pointed out the uncertainty surrounding the
outlook. Markets, however, priced out the interest rate hike
that had been expected up to then and started to expect an
interest rate cut in the coming months. As a result of the
mounting fears of an economic slowdown, increasingly
strong emphasis has been placed on risks to growth in the
ECB’s communication in 2008, leading to further easing
expectations.
The central banks of Central and Eastern Europe were forced
to adopt strict monetary policy, due to the decrease in global
risk appetite and rising inflation on the back of higher-than-
expected rise in energy and food prices. While in Hungary
this resulted first in the postponement, later in the
disappearance of the expected interest rate cuts, central
banks in the Czech Republic, Poland and Romania raised
interest rates, and markets have priced in further monetary
tightening. The base rate has not been changed in Slovakia, as
inflation expectations have risen the least in this country.
As a result of the waning risk appetite, the region’s foreign
exchange rates fell significantly in November and January.
After depreciation of the forint in November, the Hungarian
currency regained some strength, moving from EUR/HUF
259 to EUR/HUF 251. There was no significant change until
the middle of January. In the course of the January sell-off,
however, the Hungarian forint weakened to an exchange rate
of EUR/HUF 260, and – following a temporary strengthening
– it further weakened to EUR/HUF 267 during the market
turbulence in February. This represents depreciation of 6.4
per cent compared to the exchange rate at the beginning of
November, and a 5.5 per cent devaluation relative to the
exchange rate at the beginning of 2008. The forint
underperformed the other currencies of the region which did
not weaken to such a notable extent. 
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* Positive values indicate appreciation vis-à-vis the euro.
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The deterioration in the region’s perceived risk was also
reflected in the increasing price of credit default swap (CDS)
prices. The prices of these derivative products, which provide
coverage for non-payment in relation to the foreign currency
denominated bond of a given country, were considerably
higher during the November turbulence than the summer
peak in the case of Hungary and Poland. However, during
the January sell-off they reached twice that value. During the
unfavourable global market sentiment at the beginning of
February the CDS price of emerging countries increased
further. 
The forward forint interest premium, compared to long-term
euro yields, did not reflect the deterioration of the perceived
risk of Hungary until the end of December. In January
though the long-term interest rate premium exceeded the
summer figures. At the same time, the long-term yields of the
countries in the region fell, similarly to long euro yields, and
their interest premiums did not increase significantly in
January either.
Because of the postponement of interest rate cut
expectations, short-term forint yields also rose. Due to the
apparently persistent deterioration in international
conditions and the worse-than-expected inflation and wage
data in Hungary, the interest rate cuts which were previously
expected to take place at the beginning of 2008 were priced
out, in line with the change in analysts’ expectations. While
at the beginning of November a 100 basis point interest rate
cut was priced in government security yields by the end of
2008, at the end of January the market expected only a 25-
50 basis point interest rate cut. The forint devaluation in
February strengthened market expectations that the MNB
would raise its inflation forecast due to the elevated energy
price and weaker forint since the last Report, and thus
markets started to price in a rate hike. The MNB base rate
expected by the end of 2008 has increased by 100 basis
points since the end of October. 
In the past quarter, the forint foreign exchange market
position of foreigners continued to fall significantly. This
mostly meant a decrease in their exchange rate exposure
and/or the assumption of forward positions against the forint
and was not accompanied by a decrease in their asset
portfolio. While the equity portfolio of foreigners fell
slightly, their government bond portfolio grew – surpassing
the growth of the volume auctioned by ÁKK – by
approximately HUF 300 billion and reached a historic high.
However, at the beginning of the forint weakening in
February this tendency changed, and since then foreign
investors’ government bond portfolio has decreased by HUF
100 billion.
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Chart 2-6
10-year CDS in selected emerging market countries
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Chart 2-7
MNB policy rate and policy rate expectations for 
the end of 2008
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Monetary conditions
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Monetary conditions have not changed significantly since the
last Report. Although inflation was higher in Hungary than in
the euro area, due to the weakening of the forint the real
exchange rate has not changed substantially. The real interest
rate continued to hover around the 3 per cent value typical
of earlier periods. Although analysts’ inflation expectations
have risen since early autumn, this rise was counterbalanced
by increasing short-term yields resulting from the
disappearance of the formerly expected and priced interest
rate cut.
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During the review of the November Report, we adjusted our
inflation expectations upward, while we saw real economy
prospects tend towards a bit slower growth than in November.
Assuming that monetary conditions will persist at their average
January level, the consumer price index may exceed the target
over the entire horizon of the forecast, until the end of 2009,
due to considerable energy cost shocks.
9
In addition to
increasing producers’ energy costs, companies’ prospects are
increasingly uncertain because they face external demand
which is growing at a slower rate and domestic demand which
is regaining strength more slowly than expected in November.
Moreover, the impact of fiscal adjustment measures on
economic growth seems to be more long term. This may lead
to a re-evaluation of their expected income path and may result
in a stronger need to adjust. This adjustment might be stronger
in every channel. On the basis of current processes, wage and
employment adjustment in the labour market may be stronger
and quicker than expected. Despite weak demand over the
entire forecast horizon, a substantial increase in energy costs
and an accumulation of past shocks on profits, companies
should increase prices more than previously expected.
As a result of decreasing real wages, which are due to higher
unemployment and increasing inflation, the turning point in
household consumption may occur later, and over the mid-
term we expect slower growth than before. At the same time,
the worsening external and domestic real economy outlook,
in conjunction with tightening credit conditions, may limit
investment growth. Due to all these factors, we expect slower
growth over the forecast horizon.
One of our basic assumptions, the increase in the price of oil,
causes a significant change in our inflation prospects. The
exchange rate of the forint and the dollar weakened
somewhat compared to the euro, and our assumption
regarding the base rate remained the same as in November.
3.1. DETERIORATING REAL ECONOMY
PROSPECTS
Based on the surveys, companies’ prospects are more
uncertain than they were in November. On the one hand,
expectations regarding the reduction of external demand
strengthened, since the previous Report was published.
Analysts are pessimistic mainly about the growth of the US
economy. Based on preliminary data, US economic growth
was already considerably slower in the fourth quarter of last
year. In addition, analysts expect that the US economy will
stagnate in the first half of this year, and that its growth will
be permanently slower over a longer term in the future. The
slowdown in activity in the euro area and German economy,
which have a direct impact on the Hungarian economy due
to the structure of the Hungarian export market, is not yet
significant, but the related risks have also increased. In the
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3. Inflation and real economic prospects
Table 3-1
Changes in our basic assumptions
HUF/EUR USD/EUR BRENT BRENT 
(USD/barrel) futures (USD/barrel) futures
November 2007
2007 250.8 1.363 71.0 13,018.0
2008 250.8 1.422 80.2 14,135.4
2009 250.8 1.422 77.0 13,566.1
February 2008
2007 251.3 1.370 72.5 13,249.9
2008 256.0 1.470 90.9 15,819.0
2009 256.0 1.470 88.3 15,368.0
Difference: Feb./Nov. (%)
2007 0.2 0.5 2.2 1.8
2008 2.0 3.3 13.3 11.9
2009 2.0 3.3 14.7 13.3
9 Information available up to noon of the 20th of February was used in preparing the projections.
short term, however, we do not expect a drastic slowdown,
as the decrease of confidence indicators (EABCI and IFO
indicators) pertaining to the industrial activity in the euro
area and Germany has stopped in the latest months.
Nevertheless, over the entire forecast horizon, the prospects
for production and export have deteriorated as well, due to
worsening external outlook.
The increasingly uncertain prospects of companies are also
due to the fact that they face domestic demand which is
regaining strength more slowly, i.e. over the long run the
budgetary adjustment may have resulted in more
unfavourable growth prospects than was originally expected.
This can be primarily explained by two factors: low
household demand in the long term and the lack of a
significant change in investment. 
Both lower household expenditures on the demand side and
a significant increase in electricity and gas producer prices
which are expected in 2008 on the cost side contribute to a
deterioration of corporate prospects. Overall, we believe that
companies are under stronger pressure to adjust than in
November, which will happen through all available means
(price, wage and employment adjustment). On the basis of
the current information such as the substantial premium
decline in the second half of 2007, the decreasing number of
hours worked in manufacturing and the service sector and
the decreasing number of employees and vacancies in the
private sector, we believe that wage and employment
adjustment in the labour market may be stronger and quicker
than earlier. Nonetheless, quick nominal wage adjustment is
hindered by the rate of increase in the minimum wage of
skilled workers and higher consumer price index.
We do not see a significant change in the consumption
demand of households nor in retail sales, a monthly
indicator that follows changes in household consumption
demand. Therefore, we assume that the change in
consumption will be slower than the November forecast.
This is because households may experience stronger wage
and employment adjustment and considerable consumer
price increases for the entire term of the forecast, as a result
of which their real wages may be lower than expected. As a
result, the mid-term consumption of households may grow
at a slower rate than the historical average and the rate
forecast in November.
Overall, we can draw the following conclusions on the
development of economic growth prospects. Lower mid-term
export dynamics, caused by the gloomier export outlook, do
not have a significant impact on the contribution of net
export to GDP growth, because imports are expected to
increase more slowly, as a result of lower domestic use.
Lower expectations in the private sector (deteriorating
demand and cost conditions for companies and households’
lower real wage prospects) and the increase in credit spread
on the international markets will result in a lower-than-
expected investment growth rates over the medium term. At
the same time, this may be just partially compensated for by
developments financed with EU funds, which were
supposedly postponed in 2007 and are expected to appear at
a faster rate in the future, and additional investment in the
rubber industry, as reported by the media.
In addition to investments, the slower-than-expected
recovery in household consumption expenditure means that
INFLATION AND REAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS
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Chart 3-1
Components of unit labour costs in the private
sector
(Quarterly data, annual changes)
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Chart 3-2
Changes in our consumption forecast
(Consumption expenditure of households)
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the gross domestic output may increase at a lower rate than
thought in November.
3.2. FURTHER IMPROVEMENT IN OUR
FORECAST FOR EXTERNAL BALANCE
In 2007, Hungary’s external imbalance decreased at a rate
that exceeded our expectations. A significant drop in the
external financing requirement may be attributable primarily
to a steep decline in the budget deficit and to the resulting
slack domestic demand. We believe that some of these
processes will be long term, and therefore in 2008 and 2009
risks also indicate a budgetary deficit that is lower than
indicated in our previous forecast, and in the respect of
household consumption we also expect a slower change. As a
result of these factors, the external financing requirement
may be lower than forecast for the entire term of the
projection. At the same time, however, the fact that the
continued improvement of the external balance may occur in
conjunction with modest investment growth, and
consequently without a significant change in the financing
needs of companies, may pose a risk in terms of long-term
sustainability.
3.3. HIGHER INFLATION PROJECTION
DUE MAINLY TO THE INCREASE IN
ENERGY COSTS
Due to the new path of the real economy, the incoming
labour market and price information and a change in our
basic assumptions, consumer prices have increased overall
and are expected to remain above the mid-term target for the
entire time horizon of the projection. Based on our forecast,
inflation in 2008 will reach 5.9% and 3.6% in 2009. The
change is primarily caused by cost side factors. Most of the
significant change is due to a considerable increase in
producer energy prices and regulated prices, but an increase
in agricultural prices since November, primarily as a result of
temporary effects, also has a considerable impact. Wage
adjustment and weaker consumer demand are factors
decreasing inflationary pressures.
Since the last Report, new information pertaining to energy
prices has appeared in two forms in the inflation projection:
on the one hand, in the increase in producer energy prices
which do not fall under the consumer price index, and on the
other hand in the increase in household energy prices which
are a component of the consumer price index.
The reason for the increase in producer energy prices is two-
fold: due to a change in the regulation of the electricity
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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Chart 3-3
Contribution of components to GDP growth
(Based on annual changes)
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Table 3-2
Baseline path of the inflation forecast
2007. 2007. 2007. 2007. 2008. 2008. 2008. 2008. 2009. 2009. 2009. 2009. 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Unprocessed food 16.0 9.3 12.3 17.0 13.9 9.1 1.6 -4.4 -2.9 0.5 3.1 4.3
Vehicle fuel and market energy 2.3 0.6 -2.1 7.4 14.1 8.3 5.7 2.3 -1.3 -1.3 -0.9 -1.0
Regulated prices 15.3 17.6 15.6 10.1 6.7 6.4 8.1 9.2 7.9 7.1 5.2 3.9
Core inflation* 6.4 6.7 5.9 5.2 5.7 5.7 5.1 4.3 3.9 3.7 3.5 3.3
Consumer price index 8.5 8.6 7.7 7.1 7.0 6.3 5.6 4.7 4.0 3.8 3.5 3.2
Core inflation (annual average) 6.0 5.2 3.6
Consumer price index 
(annual average) 8.0 5.9 3.6
* The indicator forecasted by us may differ from the index published by the CSO temporarily, but in the long run they follow the same tendency.
market the price of producer electricity increased, and
because of higher oil prices, electricity and gas prices might
increase as well. In 2008, energy prices will increase at a
higher rate than predicted which, due to the pass-through to
consumer prices, will cause the consumer price index to be
higher than we expected for the entire time horizon of the
forecast.
Within regulated prices that constitute a part of the consumer
price index, an increase in household energy prices (gas,
electricity) – at a rate that was lower than that of producer
energy prices but at a rate that is higher than expected earlier
– caused a considerable increase in inflation.
On the basis of new agricultural price information received
since the previous Report – higher-than-expected actual
inflation and agricultural prices on the commodity exchange
– we expect agricultural prices to rise more than expected.
We believe that the reason for the additional increase since
November is temporary, and therefore we have increased
our inflation forecast for 2008 to a greater extent than for
2009.
One of our basic assumptions, considerably higher oil price
assumption increased – not just the energy prices, but also –
vehicle fuel prices, meanwhile due to a weaker exchange rate
assumption, imported inflation is higher. Factors that may
reduce the expected level of inflation to some extent are
related to cyclical processes. Stronger wage and employment
adjustment and the lower real economy path related to the
more moderate consumption path of households will have a
disinflationary effect over the entire time horizon of the
forecast.
3.4. INFLATIONARY AND GROWTH RISKS
In reviewing the November Report, we confirmed the
alternative scenarios that, at the time, we thought were
important: higher inflationary expectations over the long
term, weaker external demand, a stronger disinflationary
effect of the output gap.
In 2008, the basic path of our inflation forecast will be
surrounded by symmetrical, somewhat downside risks on the
whole, while the upward and downward risks in 2009 will be
of similar magnitude.
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Table 3-3
Breakdown of inflation projection change compared to November*
(Key items)
2008 2009
Facts ++ 0
Vehicle fuel ++ +
Agriculture + +
Imports + +
Producer gas + remote heat 0 +
Producer electricity + +
Regulated household energy + ++
ULC – –
Consumption expenditure – 0
*+, ++: upward, and strongly upward; , – : downward, and strongly downward; 0: no significant effect.
* The fan chart represents the uncertainty surrounding the basic forecast.
Overall, the coloured area cover 90 per cent probability. The central,
darkest area containing the basic forecast for the consumer price index
(as the mode of distribution) illustrated by the white dashed line covers
30 per cent of the probability. The continuous, horizontal line from
2007 shows value of the announced inflation target.
Chart 3-4
Inflation fan chart*
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As a result of a permanently high consumer price inflation,
the possibility of a permanent increase of inflationary
expectations is an upward risk during the entire time horizon
of our forecast. However, this risk is compensated by the
possibility of a more moderate external demand – which will
create a lower international inflationary environment – and
by the possibly significant disinflationary effect of the output
gap.
In the case of economic growth, the uncertainty surrounding
our basic forecast for the entire time horizon of the forecast
is characterised by significant downward risks. The reason for
this is mostly demand factors (lower external demand),
because of significant concerns surrounding mid-term
economic growth in Europe and the USA.
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* The fan chart represents the uncertainty surrounding the basic forecast.
Overall, the coloured area cover 90 per cent probability. The central,
darkest area containing the basic forecast for GDP (as the mode of
distribution) illustrated by the white dashed line covers 30 per cent of the
probability.
Chart 3-5
GDP fan chart*
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1
For technical reasons the indicator in our forecast may be temporarily different from the index published by the Central Statistical Office; however,
the two follow the same tendency in the long term. 
2
Calculated on the basis of the so-called supplemented (SNA) type of indicator; negative values mean
the reduction of aggregate demand. 
3
Due to the uncertainty of measuring, which is related to the foreign trade statistics, starting from 2004 the actually
realised import number and the current account balance deficit/external financing demand may be higher than the official numbers and than our
forecasts, which are based on such numbers. 
4
On a cash basis. 
5
According to the labour force survey conducted by the Central Statistical Office. 
6
According to the original Central Statistical Office data which also contain the effect of ‘whitening’ the economy. The data adjusted for the effect of
‘whitening’ are shown in brackets. 
7
The specific labour cost of the private sector was calculated on the basis of a ‘whitened’ wage indicator which was
adjusted for the changed seasonality of bonuses. 
8
For 2008 wages, the numbers in brackets refer to wages excluding the effect of whitening and the
changed seasonality of bonuses, which are directly comparable with those in the November Report.
* MNB-estimate.
↑ In our view the expected path of the given variable indicates a higher forecast than indicated in the November Report.
↓ In our view the expected path of the given variable indicates a lower forecast than indicated in the November Report.
↔ In our view the expected path of the given variable indicates a forecast that is similar to the November Report.
2006 2007 2008 2009
Actual Forecast/Fact estimate
November Current November Current November Current
Inflation (annual average)
Core inflation1 2.4 6.0 6.0 4.6 5.2 3.1 3.6
Consumer price index 3.9 7.9 8.0 5.0 5.9 3.0 3.6
Economic growth*
External demand (GDP-based) 3.9 3.4 3.5 2.9 2.5 2.9 2.5
Effect of fiscal demand2 2.6 -3.6 ↓ -0.8 ↔ -0.1 ↓
Household consumption 2.1 -2.1 –2.3 0.4 0.0 1.6 1.3
Memo: Household consumption expenditure 1.9 -0.3 x 0.9 x 1.8 x
Fixed capital formation -2.8 1.7 -0.5 4.2 3.5 5.5 5.1
Domestic use 1.1 0.0 -0.6 1.2 0.8 3.0 2.7
Export 18.9 15.1 14.5 11.6 10.5 10.3 9.6
Import3 14.5 13.1 12.1 10.3 9.4 10.2 9.5
GDP 3.9 1.6 1.3 2.4 2.0 3.2 3.0
Current account balance deficit
As a percentage of the GDP 6.5 5.5 ↓ 5.3 ↓ 5.2 ↓
In billion EUR 5.8 5.7 ↓ 5.9 ↓ 6.1 ↓
External financing need3
As a percentage of the GDP 5.7 4.3 ↓ 3.3 ↓ 2.8 ↓
Labour market
National economy gross average wages4,8 8.2 8.4 (7.7) 8.0 (7.3) 6.5 (6.1) 6.8 (6.4) 5.4 5.2
National economy employment5 0.7 0.4 0.2 -0.1 -0.6 -0.2 -0.4
Gross average wages in the private sector6,8 9.4 9.7 (8.3) 9.1 (8.0) 8.2 (7.7) 7.8 (7.1) 6.8 6.8
Employment in the private sector5 0.9 1.1 1.0 0.0 -0.6 -0.3 -0.6
Unit labour cost in the private sector5,7 4.4 7.0 8.0 4.4 3.4 3.0 2.7
Consumer real income -1.5* -3.0 -3.2 2.1 1.3 2.4 1.7
Table 3-4
Changes in our forecasts compared to November 2007
Since 2003, at the beginning of each year we have reviewed
the extent to which our earlier inflation forecasts for the
previous year reflected the actual outcomes. Continuing in
this tradition, this chapter compares our 2007 forecast to the
data actually recorded, in order to explore the factors that
may have caused the discrepancy and to look at the lessons to
be learned so as to improve our ability to make forecasts.
We issued forecasts for 2007 inflation on a total of 10
occasions since August 2005.
10
At the beginning of this period
– between August 2005 and May 2006 – we forecasted
inflation at around 3 per cent which was consistent with the
inflation target. In the middle and at the end of the period –
between August 2006 and November 2007 – we published
forecasts at around and in excess of 7 per cent which was
considerably higher than the inflation target. Overall,
however, our forecasts were always lower than actual
inflation. At the same time, it is true that the difference was
much larger in the first third of the period (5 percentage
points on average) than later (0.6 percentage points on
average). Although it is natural that as time passes –
simultaneously with the accumulation of information for the
given year – forecasts for the given year improve.
Nevertheless, the aforementioned discrepancy is unusually
large. The reason is that the two periods were determined by
very different processes.
At the beginning of the period, up until May 2006,
disinflationary processes were prevalent. Part of the reason
was that commodity market competition intensified after
accession to the EU, imported inflation fell, and inflationary
expectations were more moderate. In addition, the tax cut
programme, which was announced in 2005, rendered a
further disinflationary impulse more likely. At the same time
– without being able to express it numerically in our forecasts
– it was obvious that the planned budgetary/macroeconomic
path was unsustainable. Starting from the middle of 2006,
processes pointing towards a higher rate of inflation became
more pronounced. The most important component was the
announcement and implementation of a budgetary
adjustment program which played a major role directly, as
well as indirectly by increasing corporate costs and
inflationary expectations.
11
In addition, the weakening
exchange rate of the forint and increasing oil prices also
contributed to a higher rate of inflation. The labour market
also adjusted to the aforementioned events, which resulted in
a higher rate of unit labour cost increase. And finally, starting
from the middle of 2007, the shock-like increase of
agricultural and food prices worldwide also significantly
contributed to inflation.
The average absolute error in the MNB forecasts for the
entire period was somewhat smaller (2.1 percentage points)
than the error of the median of analysts who participated in
the Reuters survey (2.3 percentage points).
12
However, the
overall picture is the same: initially, both the market analysts
and MNB forecasted inflation around the target and later
much higher than the target. The only period when the
difference between the two teams of analysts was significant
is August 2006. By this time the budgetary adjustment
measures had been announced, but based on the numbers,
market analysts only gradually incorporated the effect of the
measures into their forecasts. It is also typical that the
greatest standard deviation of the forecasts of market analysts
occurred at the same time, in the summer of 2006, which
means that the assessment of the inflationary impact of the
measures was uncertain.
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4. Evaluation of our inflation forecast for 2007
10 We examine the effectiveness of our inflation forecast for 2007 on the basis of the annual average change. At the same time the question may arise as to why we do
not analyse the change that took place in December or in the fourth quarter or the annual index of all four quarters in 2007. The reason is that since August 2005 only
forecasts of the annual average were available in all reports. In addition, the 3 per cent constant inflation target can be best compared to the annual average indicator. 
11 Although the series of measures raised inflation overall, a disinflationary effect is also apparent due to a decline in household consumption demand. 
12 For the purposes of this calculation we considered only the period between November 2005 and November 2007, because in August 2005 the Reuters survey did not
contain a question regarding average inflation in 2007. 
Chart 4-1
Forecasts of average inflation in 2007 by MNB and
analysts participating in the Reuters survey
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Nevertheless, there is not much to learn simply from the
discrepancy between the MNB’s earlier forecasts and the
actual results. The reason is that the error in the forecast may
have been caused by several factors that could not be taken
into account when the projection was produced. Such factors
are the government measures that were announced later (e.g.
a significant increase of regulated prices compared to the
trend, the effect of changes in VAT rates), and a change in
our basic assumptions (in respect of the price of oil and
foreign exchange rates). If we adjust our earlier forecasts with
the inflationary effect of the deviation of the aforementioned
factors – which are exogenous for the purposes of the
forecast model – from what was assumed, we arrive at a
hypothetical forecast that would have been given if the
subsequent path of exogenous factors had been known: in
other words, we can uncover the actual error in the model
(i.e. the error that cannot be explained on the basis of
exogenous factors). The hypothetical prognoses, defined
above, were around 6 per cent until May 2006, and then
stood at 7 per cent or more. The modelling error for the
entire period was 1.1 percentage points in respect of the
consumer price index and 0.7 percentage points in respect of
core inflation. In order to judge the seriousness of this
modelling error we must take into account two factors. On
the one hand, the modelling error constitutes half of the
entire forecast error which means that a change in exogenous
factors compared to what was expected – especially in the
period between the middle of 2005 and the middle of 2006
– explains a significant portion of the entire forecast error.
On the other hand, the modelling error in respect of the
average consumer price index for the past year may be
comparable to similar errors in the past. Because we
calculated a forecast error in respect of the average inflation
only for 2005, the current data can only be compared to that
number. Overall, the 0.9 percentage point modelling error
that was recorded at that time is not significantly different
from the current 1.1 percentage point error.
13
It is also interesting to see how much our forecasts would
have improved if we had known the subsequent paths of
other factors that played a key role in the inflation forecast
EVALUATION OF OUR INFLATION FORECAST FOR 2007
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13 It may, however, be worth noting that the above calculation only makes an assumption about the primary effects of certain exogenous factors. For example, the
possible secondary effect on inflation of the government’s adjustment package may become apparent in the modelling error.
Chart 4-2
Forecasts of average inflation in 2007 by analysts
participating in the Reuters survey
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Chart 4-3
MNB forecast and fact pertaining to average
consumer inflation in 2007
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Chart 4-4
MNB forecast and fact pertaining to average core
inflation in 2007
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Per cent
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Percentage points
Unexplained error (right-hand scale)
Published
Forecast adjusted with exogenous factors
Actual
Aug.
05
Nov.
05
Feb.
06
May
06
Aug.
06
Nov.
06
Feb.
07
May
07
Aug.
07
Nov.
07
and cannot be considered exogenous and for which,
therefore, we have to make forecasts to the best of our
knowledge. There are three such key variables which are
endogenous for the purposes of the forecast process: the
consumption demand of households, the nominal unit
labour costs of the private sector and agricultural producer
prices. The consumption demand of households was
typically less than we had previously forecasted; however,
unit labour costs and agricultural producer prices increased
at a higher rate than we had anticipated. The forecast error
regarding the consumption demand of households and unit
labour costs significantly decreased starting from the second
half of 2006, after the budgetary adjustment measures
became known. On the other hand, the forecast error of
agricultural producer prices persisted until the middle of
2007 when the price of agricultural commodities rose in a
shock-like manner both globally and regionally, and
therefore this factor contributed significantly to our
modelling error. In summary, if we had known in advance
the subsequent paths of key endogenous and exogenous
variables, our forecasts would have approximated the fact
very well. It seems, therefore, that our current modelling
methods are able to identify the driving forces behind
domestic inflationary processes. At the same time this
analysis illustrates that, for example, adjustment processes
in the labour market and changes in agricultural producer
prices need further understanding and thus pose a
significant challenge for the future.
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Chart 4-5
Simulated effects of key endogenous indicators on
the forecast
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